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1. The Facts
Zenith Radio Corporation and National Union Electric Corporation
(NUE) initiated a lawsuit, in 1974, against twenty-one corporations that
manufacture or sell Japanese "consumer electronic products" (CEPs),
which consist primarily of television sets. I The plaintiffs claimed that the
defendants violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 2 section 2(a) of
the Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act, 3 section 73 of the Wilson
Tariff Act, 4 and the Antidumping Act of 19165 by illegally conspiring to
drive the plaintiffs out of the American consumer electronics market.
Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants conspired to set
artificially high prices for television sets the defendants sold in Japan and
simultaneously to set low prices for television sets sold in the United
States. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants began this conspiracy
as early as 1953 and fully implemented the scheme by the late 1960s.
After several years of extensive discovery, the defendants filed motions
for summary judgment on all claims. Pursuant to the district court's di-
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1. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
Zenith and NUE filed separately but the two cases were consolidated in 1974.
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1982).
3. Id. § 13(a).
4. Id. § 8.
5. Id. § 72.
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rection, the plaintiffs filed "Final Pre-trial Statements," which contained
all the documentary evidence the plaintiffs planned to offer if the case
went to trial. In response to the defendants' motions challenging the
admissibility of the plaintiffs' evidence, the district court held the majority
of that evidence inadmissible. 6
Based on the admissible evidence, the district court found that no
genuine issue of material fact existed to support the plaintiffs' conspiracy
theory.7 Hence, the court granted summary judgment on the Sherman
Act section 1 claims and on the claims under the Wilson Tariff Act. 8 The
court also dismissed the Sherman Act section 2 claims and ruled for the
defendants on the Robinson-Patman Act claims. 9
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 1O The
Third Circuit held much of the evidence excluded by the district court
admissible. 11 By examining the previously excluded evidence, the ap-
pellate court found the district court's ruling on the summary judgment
improper. 12 Contrary to the district court's opinion, the Third Circuit held
that a fact finder could reasonably conclude from the evidence that a
conspiracy existed to "depress prices in the American market in order
to drivc out American competitors, which conspiracy was funded by
6. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1135-39 (E.D.
Pa. 1981).
7. Id. at 1332.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983).
I1. Id. at 259-303. The evidence included the following conclusions:
(I) The Japanese market for CEPs was characterized by oligopolistic behavior, with a
small number of producers meeting regularly and exchanging information on price and
other matters. This created the opportunity for a stable combination to raise both prices
and profits in Japan. American firms could not attack such a combination because the
Japanese government imposed significant barriers to entry.
(2) Petitioners had relatively higher fixed costs than their American counterparts, and
therefore needed to operate at something approaching full capacity in order to make a
profit.
(3) Petitioners' plant capacity exceeded the needs of the Japanese market.
(4) By formal agreements arranged in cooperation with Japan's Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI), petitioners fixed minimum prices for CEPs exported to the
American market. The parties refer to these prices as the "check prices," and to the
agreements that required them as the "check price agreements."
(5) Petitioners agreed to distribute their products in the United States according to a
"five-company rule": each Japanese producer was permitted to sell only to five American
distributors.
(6) Petitioners undercut their own check prices by a variety of rebate schemes. Peti-
tioners sought to conceal these rebate schemes both from the United States Customs
Service and from MITI, the former to avoid various customs regulations as well as action
under the antidumping laws, and the latter to cover up petitioners' violations of the check
price agreements.
Matsushita Elec. Indus., 475 U.S. at 580-81 (citations omitted).
12. Id. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d at 306-09.
VOL. 22, NO. 2
PREDATORY PRICING CONSPIRACIES 531
excess profits obtained in the Japanese market." 13 In addition, the Third
Circuit found it unnecessary to rule on the defendants' claim that a foreign
sovereign (Japan) compelled their action, thereby relieving the defendants
from liability. 14
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether the court of appeals had used the proper standard to evaluate
the district court's ruling on the motion for summary judgment and to
ascertain whether the defendants could be held liable under the antitrust
laws for a conspiracy partially compelled by a foreign sovereign. 15 By a
five-to-four decision, the Court reversed and remanded on the first issue, 16
but failed to reach the second. The Court held that the court of appeals
erred by relying on evidence with little, if any, relevance to the alleged
conspiracy and for failing to consider the absence of a plausible motive
on the defendants' part to engage in such a conspiracy. 17 Because no
rational motive to conspire existed, the Court found the evidence did not
suffice to create "a genuine issue for trial." 18 On remand, however, the
Supreme Court allowed the court of appeals "to consider whether there
is other evidence that is sufficiently unambiguous to permit a trier of fact
to find that the petitioners conspired to price predatorialy for two decades
despite the absence of any apparent motive to do so." 19 Held, reversed
and remanded: In the absence of a rational motive to conspire, the plain-
tiffs' evidence of predatory pricing was insufficient to create a genuine
issue for trial and therefore could not preclude summary judgment. Mat-
sushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
On remand, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded that
no evidence existed other than that on which the court had previously
relied. The court, therefore, affirmed the summary judgment on the Sher-
man Act claims and the Antidumping Act claims. 20
II. The Legal Background
A. STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not distinguish
between a motion for summary judgment in an antitrust case and in any
other civil case. 21 When the record shows that no genuine issue as to a
13. Id. at 309.
14. Id. at 315.
15. Id., cert. granted, 471 U.S. 1002 (1985) (grant limited to two issues).
16. 475 U.S. 574, 598 (1986).
17. Id. at 595.
18. Id. at 597.
19. Id.
20. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 807 F.2d. 44, 48-49 (3d Cir. 1986).
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
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material fact exists, and the party opposing the motion fails to support
its claim, the motion will be granted. 22 Although summary judgments can
be useful in complex antitrust cases, 23 historically courts have been re-
luctant to grant them. 24
This reluctance to grant summary judgments in complex antitrust liti-
gation can be traced back to the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Poller v. CBS. 25 In that case the Court reversed a grant of summary
judgment for the defendant, stating that "summary procedures should be
used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play
leading roles." 26 In Poller the Court found that the plaintiff presented
substantial factual evidence that tended to show the existence of a con-
spiracy, and that the witnesses' credibility was crucial to a final deter-
mination of the issues, therefore making summary judgment improper.27
The Supreme Court again found summary judgment improper in White
Motor Co. v. United States.28 In that case the United States brought suit
to restrain alleged Sherman Act violations by a truck manufacturer. The
United States contended that the defendants violated sections 1 and 3 of
the Sherman Act by placing territorial restrictions in their franchise con-
tracts. 29 The Court held that the legality of the restrictions should be
determined only after a full trial because the Court could not determine
the actual impact of the restrictions based solely on the documentary
evidence.30
In Norfolk Monument Co. v. Woodlawn Memorial Gardens31 the Su-
preme Court again reversed a summary judgment granted by the district
court in favor of the defendants. The Court held "that the alleged con-
spiracy had not been conclusively disproved by pretrial discovery and
that there remained material issues of fact which could only be resolved
by the jury after a plenary trial." 32 This language has been interpreted to
mean that summary judgment should not be granted against a plaintiff
once the plaintiff's evidence would support a jury verdict in its favor,
unless the defendant can produce evidence sufficiently conclusive to war-
rant a directed verdict in its favor.33
22. First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288 (1968); FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
23. See First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290 (1968).
24. See Norfolk Monument Co. v. Woodlawn Memorial Gardens, 394 U.S. 700 (1969);
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); Poller v. CBS, 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 473.
27. Id.
28. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
29. Id. at 255-56.
30. Id. at 261-64.
31. 394 U.S. 700 (1969).
32. Id. at 704.
33. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 316 (1978).
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The Supreme Court's reluctance to grant motions for summary judg-
ment in antitrust cases has waned in recent cases. For example, in First
National Bank v. Cities Service Co.34 the Court affirmed the court of
appeals' grant of a motion for summary judgment for the defendants
because the plaintiff failed to show sufficient evidence of a conspiracy to
raise a genuine issue for trial. 35 The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the
defendant oil companies conspired to boycott Iranian oil, thereby inter-
fering with the plaintiff's ability to sell Iranian oil it had purchased under
contract. 36 The Court distinguished Poller by finding that it was plausible
to believe the defendants' interest coincided in Cities Service, whereas in
Poller the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant made it
plausible to believe the defendant conspired to drive the plaintiff out of
business. 37 To have survived the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment, the plaintiff would have had to show that the evidence to be intro-
duced at trial would be more consistent with the inference that the
defendant's conduct resulted from an alleged conspiracy than the infer-
ence that the defendant acted independently. 38 The Court paid only lip
service to Poller to reach its decision.
The Court's decisions in Cities Service, and more recently in Zenith v.
Matsushita, illustrate that the language in Poller is not always a bar to
summary judgment in antitrust cases. 39 The Supreme Court did not even
cite Poller in reaching its decision in Zenith. This oversight may have
been intentional, indicating that Poller may have lost its once strong
influence.
B. PREDATORY PRICING
The goal of antitrust law is to protect competition, not competitors. 40
Generally, lower prices are a desirable result of that competition, but
under certain conditions firms may lower prices for an anticompetitive
purpose.4 1 For this reason, "predatory pricing" is an offense within both
the Sherman Act 42 and the Robinson-Patman Act. 43
34. 391 U.S. 253 (1968).
35. Id. at 254-55.
36. Id. at 259-60.
37. Id. at 285.
38. Id.
39. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 33, 316.
40. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
41. Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Activities Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 697 (1975). For example, a firm that sells at below
cost prices in order to drive out or exclude rivals is exhibiting anticompetitive behavior.
Id..
42. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
43. Id. § 13(a); see Brodley & Hay, Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic Theories
and the Evolution of Legal Standards, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 738, 765-66 (1981).
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While the courts have not developed a definitive test for predatory
pricing, the practice is generally characterized as an attempt by a firm
with substantial market power to drive out or exclude its rivals by selling
at artificially low prices. 44 To succeed, the firm must have "(1) greater
financial staying power than [its] rivals, and (2) a very substantial prospect
that the losses [it] incurs in the predatory campaign will be exceeded by
the profits to be earned after [its] rivals have been destroyed. ' 45 Without
these two factors, predation would ordinarily be economically irrational. 46
Before 1975, predatory pricing cases were rare. 47 Following the pub-
lication of an article by Areeda and Turner in 1975 the number of cases
increased dramatically. 48 Areeda and Turner developed a standard, set
forth in their article, that lays out a series of presumptions to distinguish
competitive from anticompetitive pricing in a Sherman Act section 2 case. 49
A price higher than the firm's marginal cost is deemed lawful, while any
price below marginal cost is conclusively presumed illegal. 50
Although no court has completely embraced the Areeda-Turner test,
most of the federal courts have adopted some of the test's elements. 51
For example, in Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp. the First Circuit
relied on the fact that the defendant's prices remained above cost even
after its price cuts; those cuts therefore were not predatory.52 To hold
such price cuts unlawful, the court reasoned, would " 'chill' highly de-
sirable precompetitive price cutting." 53
The Ninth Circuit has used a different approach to establish predatory
pricing. Under the "Inglis-Transamerica" test the plaintiff must prove
"that the anticipated benefits of the prices, at the time they were set,
44. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 584 n.8.
45. Areeda & Turner, supra note 41, at 698.
46. 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW $ 7l1d, at 153 n. ll (1978).
47. Libeler, Whither Predatory Pricing? From Areeda and Turner to Matsushita, 61 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1052, 1052 (1986).
48. Id. at 1053.
49. Areeda & Turner, supra note 41, at 732-33.
50. Id. at 733. Areeda and Turner divided a firm's costs into several categories: (I) fixed
costs-costs that do not vary with output; (2) variable costs--costs that do vary with output;
(3) marginal costs-the additional cost that results from producing an additional unit of
output; (4) average total costs-total cost (fixed and variable) divided by output; and (5) average
variable costs-total variable cost divided by output. Id. at 700-01.
51. See, e.g., Northeastern Tel. Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 87 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982); Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 615 F.2d. 427, 431 (7th Cir. 1980); Pacific Eng'g & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
551 F.2d 790, 797 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977); National Ass'n of Regulatory
Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 637 n.34 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976).
52. Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232 (1st Cir. 1983) ("modern
antitrust courts look to the relation of price to 'avoidable' or 'incremental' costs as a way
of segregating price cuts that are 'suspect' from those that are not.").
53. Id. at 235.
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depended on their anticipated destructive effect upon competition and the
consequent enhanced market position of the defendant. ' 54 The court,
however, did not totally reject the cost/price standard espoused by Areeda
and Turner, for it adopted a cost-based test to shift the burden of proof.55
Once the plaintiff proves that the defendant cut prices to below "average
variable cost," 56 "the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of pred-
atory pricing and the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the
prices were justified without regard to any anticipated destructive effect
they might have on competitors." 57 The Ninth Circuit in effect added the
extra element of intent to the Areeda-Turner test. 58
The Supreme Court has yet to consider the Areeda-Turner test, or any
other test for predatory pricing. The Court has discussed predatory pricing
in many cases, as it does in Matsushita, without ruling on what constitutes
the offense. 59 Despite skepticism as to whether such schemes are ever
attempted, the Court did acknowledge, after Matsushita, that the practice
of predatory pricing does occur, albeit infrequently. 60
III. The Court's Analysis-Matsushita Electric Industrial
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.
Justice Powell, writing for the Court, began the opinion by emphasizing
the claims for which the plaintiffs could not recover. Justice Powell es-
tablished at the outset that the plaintiffs could not recover antitrust dam-
ages based on an alleged cartelization of the Japanese market because
the Sherman Act cannot regulate the conduct of other nations except
when that conduct has an effect on American commerce. 61 Second, the
54. William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1034
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); see also Transamerica Computer Co. v.
IBM, 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1983).
55. Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1036.
56. Average variable cost is defined as total variable cost divided by output. Areeda &
Turner, supra note 41, at 700.
57. Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1036.
58. See Southern Pac. Communications v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 740 F.2d 980, 1004 (D.C.
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1359 (1985) (discussing test used by Ninth Circuit in
Inglis and Transamerica).
59. See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
60. Cargill, Inc. v. Montfort of Colorado, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 484, 493 (1986).
61. 475 U.S. at 582 (citing United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443
(2d Cir. 1945)); see also Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S.
690, 704 (1962); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 612 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985). In Matsushita, the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants' supracompetitive pricing in Japan had an effect on U.S. commerce as a result
of artificially depressed prices for consumer electronic products in the U.S. The Court,
however, stated that the alleged cartelization of the Japanese market could not have caused
that effect for twenty years. Once the defendants decided to reduce output and raise prices
in Japan, as the plaintiffs alleged, the next logical step was to sell more goods in other
markets to increase profits, a decision that does not flow from cartelization of the Japanese
market. 475 U.S. at 583 n.6.
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plaintiffs could not recover for a conspiracy to charge higher than com-
petitive prices in the United States because the plaintiffs would not suffer
an antitrust injury as a result of such a conspiracy.62 Finally, the plaintiffs
could not recover for a conspiracy to impose non-price restraints that
raise market price or limit output because again, such restraints would
not injure the plaintiffs. 63 The Court found that since the plaintiffs could
not recover on the above claims standing alone, the Third Circuit erred
to the extent it found evidence of the above alleged conspiracies to be
direct evidence of a conspiracies to injure the plaintiffs. 64
Even though evidence of the above conspiracies could not be used to
recover antitrust damages, the plaintiffs argued that the evidence could
be used to support the claims of conspiracy by the defendants to mo-
nopolize the United States market by pricing below market level. 6 5 The
court of appeals found that if the plaintiffs proved this allegation, it would
be a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 66 Since the defen-
dants did not appeal from that conclusion, the only issue for decision
became whether the plaintiffs presented sufficient probative evidence to
survive the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 67
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT ANALYSIS
In the third part of the Court's opinion Justice Powell stated the con-
ventional standard for surviving a motion for summary judgment. 6 8 To
defeat the motion, the plaintiffs had to show that a genuine issue of
material fact existed as to whether the defendants entered into an illegal
conspiracy which caused the plaintiffs' injury.69 According to the Court,
this showing consisted of two parts. First, the plaintiffs had to show that
they suffered an antitrust injury.70 Only evidence of the alleged conspiracy
to monopolize the American market through predatory pricing could be
62. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1977). Before a
plaintiff can recover damages under the antitrust laws, the plaintiff must show it suffered
an injury by reason of something against the antitrust laws. See id. at 489.
63. 475 U.S. at 583. As the Court pointed out, these types of restrictions would actually
benefit competitors by making supracompetitive pricing more attractive. Id.
64. Id.; see In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 304-05 (3rd Cir.
1983).
65. 475 U.S. at 583.
66. 723 F.2d at 306. Courts have described various agreements as unlawful per se under
section I of the Sherman Act because of "their necessary effect." See generally 2 P. AREEDA
& D. TURNER, supra note 33, 314; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
These per se offenses include price-fixing, boycotts and tying arrangements.
67. 475 U.S. at 585.
68. Id. at 585-86.
69. Id. at 586.
70. Id.
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used to satisfy this requirement, since the other alleged conspiracies could
not have caused the plaintiffs to suffer such an injury.71 Second, the
plaintiffs had to show that a "genuine" issue of fact existed. 72 Citing
Cities Service, the Court stated that if the entire record "could not lead
a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 'genuine
issue for trial'. "73
Expanding on conventional summary judgment principles, the Court
reasoned that the factual context of each case must be considered when
determining the quantum of proof necessary to support a plaintiff's
claim.74 Because Zenith's claim did not make sense economically, the
Court determined that the plaintiffs must present more persuasive evi-
dence than usually necessary to support the claim. 75 Only if the evidence
" 'tends to exclude the possibility' that the alleged conspirators acted
independently," could the plaintiffs defeat the motion for summary judg-
ment. 76 In order to evaluate the evidence, the Court had to "consider
the nature of the alleged conspiracy and the practical obstacles to its
implementation." 77
B. PREDATORY PRICING CONSPIRACIES
To elucidate the "nature of the alleged conspiracy," Justice Powell
launched into an analysis of predatory pricing. 78 Throughout the discus-
sion, the Court expressed skepticism that a predatory pricing conspiracy
would ever arise. 79 To reach this conclusion, the Court relied for the most
part on the commentators, among whom "there is a consensus ... that
predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely
successful.'"80
Predatory pricing schemes are inherently risky because the predatory
firm always loses profits in the short run and any gain in the long run
depends upon successfully driving out the competition. 81 Not only must
the predatory firm achieve monoply power, it must maintain that power
long enough to recover its losses and earn additional profits. 82 To succeed,
71. Id. According to the Court, the other alleged conspiracies actually benefitted the
plaintiffs. Id.
72. Id. ("When the moving party has carried its burden under rule 56(c), its opponent
must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts." (footnotes omitted)).
73. Id. at 587 (citing Cities Serv., 391 U.S. at 289).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 588.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 588-89.
79. Id. at 589.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. SUMMER 1988
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"[tihe predator must make a substantial investment with no assurance
that it will pay off.",83
The Court further expressed skepticism that such a conspiracy would
ever exist among a cartel, as the plaintiffs alleged in Matsushita. 84 In that
situation, success depends upon each firm's "willingness to endure losses
for an indefinite period. ' 85 This gives "each conspirator ... a strong
incentive to cheat, letting its partners suffer the losses necessary to de-
stroy the competition while sharing in any gains if the conspiracy
succeeds." 86
The Court further discounted the likelihood of the claimed conspiracy
by pointing to the fact that twenty years after the alleged conspiracy began,
RCA and the plaintiffs held the two largest shares of the retail television
market, not the defendants. 87 Furthermore, those shares did not appre-
ciably decline during the existence of the alleged conspiracy.88 Because
the prospect of recouping their losses by achieving and maintaining mo-
nopoly power was so slight, the Court reasoned that the defendants were
especially unlikely to engage in a predatory pricing conspiracy.89
The Court next focused on whether the defendants had any motive to
engage in such a conspiracy.90 In order simply to break even, defendants
would have to sustain their cartel for years. 91 Their ability to do that
depended on the continued cooperation of all the conspirators, the inabil-
ity of new competitors to enter the market, and the conspirators' ability
to escape antitrust liability for price-fixing after they achieved a monop-
oly.92 The fact that the defendants may have made supracompetitive prof-
its in Japan did not lessen the economic hurdles to success the defendants
faced in the United States. 93 Based on the obstacles before the defendants,
83. Id. (quoting Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counter-Strategies, 48 U. CHI.
L. REV. 263, 268 (1981)).
84. 475 U.S. at 589. A cartel is a combination of producers of a product who join together
to centrol production, sale, and price and to obtain a monopoly in any particular industry
or commodity. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 195 (5th ed. 1979).






91. Id. at 592-93.
92. Id. The Court pointed out that to recoup their losses, defendants would have to
engage in some form of price-fixing after they had gained a monopoly because of the large
number of firms involved. Section I of the Sherman Act forbids such price-fixing. Id. at
592 n.16 (citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940)).
93. Id. at 592.
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the Court could find no motive on the defendants' part to engage in such
a conspiracy.94
Given this lack of motive, the Court relied on Cities Service and Mon-
santo to find that if the defendants had no motive to conspire and the
conduct was subject to equally valid explanations, the conduct did not
support an inference of conspiracy.95 The Court reasoned that to allow
courts to infer conspiracies when such inferences were implausible would
serve to deter competition. 96 After balancing the need to protect legitimate
price competition97 against the desire to punish illegal conspiracies,98 the
Court found that granting summary judgment in cases with ambiguous
evidence would not encourage such conspiracies.99
C. THE DISSENTING OPINION
The dissent, written by Justice White, found the majority's holding
"indeed remarkable." 100 Specifically, Justice White criticized the majority
opinion on three grounds. 101 First, he took issue with the Court's state-
ments about the standard for summary judgment. 102 Second, he felt the
Court's analysis invaded the fact finder's province. 103 Finally, Justice
White stated that the Court faulted the Third Circuit for "nonexistent"
error and remanded the case unnecessarily. 104
Justice White agreed with the Court's initial discussion of the standards
for summary judgment, but he felt that the Court eventually departed
from traditional summary judgment doctrine. 105 According to Justice
White, the majority strayed from tradition by interpreting Monsanto to
stand for the proposition that courts should not allow fact finders to infer
94. Id. at 593. The ease of entry into the CEP market further supports the Court's finding
of no motive to conspire. Even if successful, defendant would continuously be faced with
new entrants into the market.
95. Id. at 593-95; see Cities Serv., 391 U.S. at 278-80; Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Serv.
Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762-64 (1983).
96. 475 U.S. at 593 (citing Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 762-64).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 595. The Court stated that unlike other schemes that violate antitrust laws,
failed predatory pricing schemes are costly to conspirators. Therefore, such schemes are
self-deterring. Id.; see Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REV. I, 26 (1984).
If successful, predatory pricing schemes involving many firms can easily be detected and
punished because to be of benefit, some type of minimum price-fixing agreement would be
needed. 475 U.S. at 595.
100. 475 U.S. at 598-99.
101. Id. (White, Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
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conspiracies when such an inference would be implausible. 106 According
to Justice White, Monsanto simply held that "a particular piece of evi-
dence standing alone was insufficiently probative to justify sending a case
to the jury." 10 7 By requiring a judge in an antitrust case to decide if the
inference of conspiracy is more probable than not, the Court invaded the
province of the fact finder, thereby overturning settled law. 108
Justice White also disagreed with the assumptions the majority made
to define what the plaintiffs had to show to recover under section 1 of
the Sherman Act.109 The Court found that to recover the plaintiffs had
to show that the defendants had conspired to drive them out of the relevant
markets by pricing below the level necessary to sell the defendants' prod-
ucts or pricing below cost. 110 This argument assumed that any other type
of agreement could not have injured the plaintiffs."' The testimony of
one of the plaintiffs' expert witnesses, excluded erroneously by the district
court, directly contradicted this assumption. 112 The expert testified that
defendants' conduct had harmed the plaintiffs. Justice White found this
testimony alone sufficient to create a genuine factual issue. 113 By ignoring
the expert's report, and assuming that the defendants favored profit-max-
imization over growth, the Court invaded the province of the fact finder. 114
Finally, unlike the majority, Justice White found nothing wrong with
the Third Circuit's disposition of the case. 115 The Court claimed that the
court of appeals erred by treating evidence of price-fixing in Japan, the
five-company rule, and check prices, as direct evidence of a conspiracy. 116
The Third Circuit, however, simply found after reviewing this evidence
that a fact finder could reasonably conclude that the five-company rule
106. Id. at 600.
107. Id.




112. Id. The expert, Dr. DePodwin, produced a report that the Third Circuit partially
relied upon. In his report Dr. DePodwin indicated that the plaintiffs were harmed in two
ways without reference to whether the defendants priced their products below cost or below
the "level necessary to sell their products." First, by raising prices in Japan, the defendants
sold fewer of their goods in that country. This resulted in increased exports to the United
States, which in turn depressed prices in the U.S. and injured the plaintiffs. Second, DePodwin
asserted that the defendants entered into agreements with other companies to avoid com-
petition among the group in the U.S. market. These agreements caused the plaintiffs to lose
business they otherwise would have had, had the defendants continued competing with one
another. Id. at 601-02.
113. Id. at 603.
114. Id. at 604.
115. Id.
116. Id.; see supra note 14 for an explanation of the "five-company rule" and "check
prices."
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was not used solely to raise prices, 117 and therefore, raised an issue of
material fact. Justice White also faulted the Court for seeming to require
the Third Circuit to "engage in academic discussions about predation." 118
The court's role is to decide, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the plaintiffs, whether a fact finder could conclude that the
defendants engaged in long-term, below-cost sales. 119 This path is pre-
cisely the one the Third Circuit took, and Justice White found it pointless
to remand the case so that it could repeat the process. 120
IV. Practical Implications
The Supreme Court's holding in Matsushita will undoubtedly have a
great impact on the disposition of future antitrust conspiracy cases as
well as on competition itself. By raising the standard of proof necessary
to show a genuine issue of material fact in a predatory pricing conspiracy
suit, the Court has both furthered and subverted the goals of antitrust
law. On the one hand, the Court's decision will encourage competitors
to lower prices without fear of reprisal. At the same time, however, those
who have suffered an antitrust injury as a result of a truly predatory
conspiracy will be discouraged from seeking redress unless they possess
direct evidence of the alleged conspiracy.
V. Conclusion
Matsushita presented to the Supreme Court an opportunity to announce
a definitive test for predatory pricing and thereby resolve a split among
the circuits. Instead of seizing this chance, the Supreme Court chose to
raise the standard of proof necessary to infer such a conspiracy without
defining the offense. By doing so, the Court usurped the jury's role and
left lower courts and businessmen dangling.
Why the Court raised the standard of proof and avoided defining pred-
atory pricing may be the result of several factors. First, antitrust con-
spiracy cases are complex, expensive, and extremely time-consuming.
The Supreme Court's decision makes it easier for the lower courts to
dispose summarily of these cases. Also, this decision discourages busi-
nessmen from bringing suit because of the extra volume of evidence and
extra expense needed to prevail. Thus, the efficiency of the court system
is enhanced. Second, a test for predatory pricing would of necessity have
to be based on economic calculations, in themselves open to many inter-
117. 475 U.S. at 605.
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pretations. The Justices may well have decided that courts should avoid
the minefield of conflicting economic theories and instead focus on such
factors as motive to decide whether the evidence created a genuine issue
of fact. Finally, the decision may have been the result of the Court's
reluctance to accept the fact that a conspiracy to price predatorily could
ever exist among a cartel. That the conspiracy had allegedly been in force
for twenty years with no evidence of success in the United States market
heavily influenced the court.
Granted, conspiracies to price predatorily may be rare. Yet, when such
behavior occurs, it must be punished. The Court suggests that the firms
may be punished only after they have succeeded. 121 By then, however,
many small competitors may have been driven out of business. By failing
to take the lead and create a test for predatory pricing, the Supreme Court
has left those small businesses with no practicable way to stop such
predatory behavior before it is too late.
121. Id. at 593.
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